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Abstract
This paper studies to what extent individuals form their preferences towards trade policies along
the lines of the Stolper-Samuelson logic. We employ a novel international survey data set with
an extensive coverage of high-, middle-, and low-income countries, address a subtle methodological
shortcoming in previous studies and condition on aspects of individual “enlightenment”. We ﬁnd
statistically signiﬁcant and economically large Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects. In the United States, being
high-skilled increases an individual’s probability of favoring free trade by up to twelve percentage
points, other things equal. In Ethiopia, the eﬀect amounts to eight percentage points, but in exactly
the opposite direction.
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Low- and middle-income countries such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia have (re-)entered the stage
of the world economy. These economies, home to a substantial portion of world population, show high
degrees of trade openness and have recently boasted enormous output growth; see Freeman (2009,
p. 63).1 The rapid integration of emerging markets into the global economy promises substantial
gains from trade. Yet, these gains seem endangered by anti-free trade campaigns motivated by glob-
alization fears. Can we explain this tension by the well-known Stolper-Samuelson arguments? From
a neoclassical point of view, the new global economic architecture implies that developed economies
like the United States or Europe import low-skilled labor from developing countries like China, in-
directly, through the factors embodied in traded goods. This will result in changes of relative wages
or unemployment, making the scarce factors worse oﬀ and beneﬁtting the abundant factors. In this
sense, economic theory fuels the public debate on the potential link between “globalization” and con-
temporaneous increases in wage inequality in many advanced countries. This is despite the fact that
it has turned out diﬃcult to empirically disentangle the eﬀects of globalization on wage inequality
from those originating in skill-biased technological change; see Feenstra & Hanson (2003), Lawrence
(2008), and Krugman (2008).
This paper takes an altogether diﬀerent perspective on this discussion. It draws attention to
how people expect international trade to aﬀect their income situations. Looking through the lens of
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, we study empirically whether and to what extent the distributional
predictions of free trade are shaping individuals’ attitudes towards protection. We ﬁnd a characteristic
pattern which is consistent with endowment-based views of comparative advantage highlighted by the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Given that individual attitudes towards trade co-determine trade
policy outcomes, this potentially has wider implications in a political economy context; see Rodrik
(1995). It also sheds light on the rising demand for protection in developed countries; see Scheve
& Slaughter (2007). Since unskilled labor makes the bulk of the labor force in all countries, but
is intensively used in the comparative disadvantage sector only in advanced countries, the Western
world would seem prone to a new wave of protectionism.2
1From 2006 to 2007, real gross domestic products of Brazil, China, India, and Russia grew by 5.3%, 13.0%, 9.1%, and
8.1%, respectively; the degrees of trade openness (measured as the sum of the value of imports and exports over total
output) for these economies range between 25% (Brazil) and 75% (China) in 2007; all four countries together comprise
nearly 2.8 billion people in 2007, which was then as much as about 42% of total world population; all data come from
the World Development Indicators (2007).
2In fact, there is not a single OECD economy with a majority of people having attained tertiary education, the level
of education which is typically seen as essential in qualifying for a high-skilled job. The OECD average of people with
tertiary education in 2007 is 28% for the population aged 25-64; see OECD (2009, p. 29f.).
2Despite its narrow focus, this chain of reasoning ﬁnds support by two stylized facts. First, the
countries with the least favorable views towards globalization are middle- and high-income countries,
including the United States, France, and Japan. By contrast, people in the poorest countries, including
China, India and many African states, exhibit on average the most positive attitudes towards trade;
see Pew GAP (2007, p. 1). Second, the public’s opinion on free trade has signiﬁcantly changed to
the worse during the last decade, but only in the developed world. In January 2000, 35 percent of
the American adult population believed that trade is a “threat to the economy from foreign imports”.
This number has almost steadily increased over the years, reaching a critical level of 52 percent in
February 2008, an all time high since September 1992.3 A similar trend can be found in Western
Europe, but not in China or India; see Pew GAP (2007, p. 1).
Our paper builds on O’Rourke & Sinnott (2001) and Mayda & Rodrik (2005), who ﬁnd that high-
skilled individuals are more likely to be pro-trade than low-skilled individuals, but only in countries
with high incomes per capita. Scheve & Slaughter (2006), O’Rourke (2006) and Mayda et al. (2007)
provide evidence that is consistent with a factor endowments interpretation of this result.4 Our work
contributes to this strand of literature in three ways. First, we employ the 2007 wave of the Pew
Global Attitudes Project (GAP), a novel international survey data set with an extensive coverage of
high-, middle-, and low-income economies. We highlight that the performance of the existing approach
to identifying Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects is sensitive to the country coverage of the underlying survey
data.
Secondly, we address a weakness on the methodological side in the literature and show that
estimates in a Probit framework, as commonly applied in related studies, lack a proper interpretation.
As a straightforward remedy to this shortcoming, we apply, inter alia, the simple linear probability
model (LPM). In the present context, the advantage of our approach is that it consistently controls
for any kind of country-speciﬁc inﬂuence on the formation of trade policy preferences. This includes
potentially important “fundamentals” such as a country’s political system, but also feedback eﬀects
from existing trade policies and previous trade exposure.
Finally, we consider a recent critique by Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) and Mansﬁeld & Mutz
3The numbers come from Gallup’s annual World Aﬀairs poll, which since 1992 conducts telephone interviews
with approximately one thousand randomly selected American adults, aged 18 or older. Interviewers ask the fol-
lowing question: “What do you think foreign trade means for America? Do you see foreign trade as – an oppor-
tunity for economic growth through increased U.S. exports, or a threat to the economy from foreign imports?” See
http://www.gallup.com/poll/115240/Americans-Negative-Positive-Foreign-Trade.aspx for details.
4Recent years have seen a surge in empirical research on individual trade policy preferences. For example, evidence
from purely national surveys come from Scheve & Slaughter (2001), Blonigen (2008), Hoﬀman (2009), and Ehrlich &
Maestas (2010) for the United States and from Wolfe & Mendelsohn (2005) for Canada. Beaulieu et al. (2005) document
cross-country evidence from Latin America.
3(2009), who argue that high-skilled individuals are more likely to favor free trade due to a general
“enlightenment” that comes with a better educational background. Arguably, this enlightenment
could date from both a better understanding of the beneﬁcial role of international trade (the ag-
gregate gains from trade) and a general (classroom) stimulation of individuals’ openness towards
foreign cultures and ideas. With this enlightenment being stronger in rich countries with high-quality
education systems, the numbers so far obtained from regression analyses could be subject to poor
identiﬁcation. For this reason, we explicitly capture individuals’ economic awareness and their incli-
nations towards nationalist ideas and carry out baseline estimations of the eﬀects of various aspects
of individual enlightenment. Our data are not inconsistent with Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) and
Mansﬁeld & Mutz (2009), but ﬁnd the factor endowments model to survive all speciﬁcations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical strategy,
starting out with a condensed Stolper-Samuelson view on free trade preferences and proceeding with
a discussion of the econometric model and our survey data. Section 3 turns to a detailed presentation
of our regression results. The ﬁnal section concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Strategy
This section presents our empirical approach to studying Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects on free trade
preferences. The ﬁrst subsection explains how the distributional eﬀects of trade liberalization in the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model translate into diﬀerent individual attitudes towards trade. In the
second subsection, we set up a simple random utility framework to discuss the relevant econometric
issues that arise in our context. In so doing, we slightly modify the existing modelling approach along
several dimensions, as will become evident below. The ﬁnal subsection presents our survey data in
some detail. It also looks at whether and how trade preferences correlate with governments’ policies
and countries’ stages of development.
2.1 A Stolper-Samuelson View on Free Trade Preferences
The distributional eﬀects of trade policy interventions in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson setting with
two factors of production and two goods can be appropriately discussed by recalling the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem; see Stolper & Samuelson (1941). In its general version the theorem states that
protection of domestic import-competing industries will raise the real reward of the scarce factor and
lower the real return to the abundant factor.5 This result emerges from the diﬀerentiated zero proﬁt
5The notion of a “general” version of the theorem was introduced by Bhagwati (1959); see also Deardorﬀ (1993).
4conditions, which in terms of proportional changes are given by
ˆ pℓ = θℓL ˆ wL + θℓH ˆ wH for ℓ = 1,2, (1)
where a ‘hat’ indicates a percentage change, the θℓj’s are the cost shares of high- and low-skilled labor
(with j = H,L), the pℓ’s are goods prices, and the wj’s are factor prices.6
Protection, for example through an import tariﬀ, increases the domestic relative price of the
imported good.7 From equation (1), goods price changes are a cost-share weighted average of factor
price changes. This implies that the ˆ pℓ’s lie in between the ˆ wj’s. Let p1 denote the price of the imported
commodity with ˆ p1 > 0 through the imposition of a tariﬀ. The price of the factor which is intensively
used in the import-competing sector, say low-skilled labor (i.e. θ1L > θ2L), rises disproportionately
compared to the commodity price. By the same logic, high-skilled labor experiences a real income loss,
ˆ wL > ˆ p1 > ˆ p2 > ˆ wH. If we further impose the assumptions necessary to establish the Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem – identical technologies and preferences across countries and no factor intensity reversals –
it follows that protection harms the country’s abundant factor because it is intensively employed in
the export industry.
Hypothesis 1. In human-capital-abundant economies, high-skilled individuals favor free trade, while
low-skilled individuals oppose free trade. In labor-abundant economies, this conﬂict of interests is
reversed.
One of the captivating features of the Stolper-Samuelson logic is that it reﬂects changes in a
country’s factor supply, because inputs are embodied in traded goods. Speaking with Deardorﬀ
(1993, p. 7), “The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem [...] states what might appear obvious to many outside
of economics. In its simple form [...] it says that protection helps the scarce factor, or, equivalently,
that free trade hurts the scarce factor. [...] [Many politicians and others in the public at large] say
that of course trade lowers wages in the United States, since it makes American labor compete with
foreign labor that may be paid only a fraction as much.” In a wider sense, hypothesis 1 therefore
draws on how people expect international trade to aﬀect their incomes. Consequently, any empirical
test of this hypothesis is informative as to the extent to which individuals are sensitive towards how
an integrated world economy may aﬀect the relative scarcity of their factors, compared to an autarky
6In what follows, the terms ‘high-skilled labor’ and ‘human capital’ are used interchangeably. Analogously for ‘low-
skilled labor’ and ‘labor’.
7Metzler (1949) shows that the imposition of an import tariﬀ raises the domestic relative price of the imported
good only if the elasticity of foreign demand for domestic exports is greater than the domestic marginal propensity
to consume the exported good. The restriction to the small economy case precludes any terms-of-trade eﬀects and is
therefore suﬃcient to obtain this result.
5situation.8
Hypothesis 1 also implies that whether an individual will oppose or favor protection will entirely
depend on the direction, but not the magnitude of the predicted utility change. The prediction for
an individual’s free trade preference is solely determined by whether the factor is relatively scarce or
abundant compared to the rest of the world, essentially because individuals are confronted with a
binary choice; see Balistreri (1997). To see why the degree of relative scarcity of the two factors may
also be decisive for preference formation, we incorporate country-pair-speciﬁc trading costs.
If trade costs are prohibitively high for some country pairs, each country will only trade with a
subset of the other countries. As a result, comparative advantage is no longer deﬁned globally; see
Deardorﬀ (2004). We do not inspect the trade pattern of individual countries here. But it is clear
that, other things equal, the probability that a certain factor in a given country is used intensively
in the comparative advantage sector is the higher, the higher the relative abundance of this factor in
that country. We get the following prediction.
Hypothesis 2. A high-skilled individual is more likely to favor free trade, the higher a country’s
human-capital-to-labor ratio. The reverse holds true for a low-skilled individual.
Importantly, both hypotheses are independent of whether or not tariﬀs are prohibitively high. This
is because there is no role for the magnitude of an individual’s trade-policy induced utility change,
and because the direction of the goods price change does not depend on the degree of protection.
2.2 Econometric Model
The fundamental idea in our regression analysis is that trade policy interventions in the form of
import tariﬀs (or the withdrawal thereof) have eﬀects on an individual’s utility level due to changes
in personal earnings, both in expectation terms. We provide a combined test of hypotheses 1 and 2
and closely follow previous studies in estimating the interaction eﬀect between individual skill and a
country’s degree of human capital abundance.
For this purpose, we set up the following random utility framework. Let the expected utility change
of individual i in country c when moving towards free trade (E[∆Uic|Free Trade]) be a linear function
of the expected income change ` a la Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (E[∆wic|HOS]), which depends on
individual skill hic and the residence country’s degree of human capital abundance hc. Let the
eﬀect of other individual attributes such as age, income, or education and that of other country
8In a Ricardo-Viner setting, one can draw lines between sectors instead of factors for the distributional conﬂicts of
trade liberalization; see Mayda & Rodrik (2005) for an empirical application to individual-level trade policy preferences.
For an attempt to bring the distributional predictions of the “new new trade theory” with heterogeneous ﬁrms and
workers to individual survey data see Walter (2010). For reasons of data availability and conciseness, in this paper we
exclusively focus on the explanatory power of the factor endowments model.
6characteristics such as the political system, the stage of development, or the actual trade policies
be summarized in Aic(.) and Bc(.), respectively. Decomposing Aic(.) into a function of observables
aic ≡ a(Xic1,...,XicL) and an unobservable random component αic, and analogously for Bc(.) with
bc ≡ b(Zc1,...,ZcK) and βc, we have
E[∆Uic|Free Trade] = E[∆wic|HOS](hic,hc) + aic + bc + αic + βc. (2)
We aim for an estimable equation of (2). An individual’s expected income change is unobserved.
Our analysis must therefore take the link between such expectations and individual trade policy
preferences as given. Assuming that this link exists, we ask whether parameter estimates on the ar-
guments of E[∆wic|HOS](hic,hc) can be interpreted as reﬂecting a Stolper-Samuelson data generating
process. Hence, we rewrite equation (2) as
E[∆Uic|Free Trade] = γ0 + γ1 · hic + γ2 · hic × hc + γc + aic + αic, (3)
where γ1 and γ2 are the parameters of interest and γc ≡ γ(hc,bc,βc) is a ﬁxed eﬀect which absorbs
both observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the country level.
The left-hand side of equation (3), the expected utility change as such, is an unobservable latent
variable. Following existing literature, we construct an individual-speciﬁc pro-trade dummy variable
from our survey data which serves as an indicator for the sign of the expected change in utility,
Yic
def = 1(E[∆Uic|Free Trade] > 0). If we additionally impose αic ∼ Normal(0,1), we can write an
individual’s probability of being in favor of free trade, conditional on all explanatory variables, as
Pr(Yic = 1|·) = Φ(γ0 +γ1 ·hic +γ2 ·hic ×hc +γc +aic). This is the familiar Probit framework, where




= Φ′(·)[γ1 + γ2hc], (4)
and how this eﬀect varies with a country’s degree of human capital abundance,
∆2 Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic∆hc
= Φ′(·)γ2 + Φ′′(·)[γ1γ2hic + γ2
2hichc]. (5)
This strategy involves a subtle technical issue. In non-linear models, the right hand sides of equations
(4) and (5), given the country ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation in (3), cannot be computed without violating
the ceteris paribus assumption of comparative statics analysis. The reason is that, in contrast to linear
models, the derivatives (or diﬀerences) in (4) and (5) depend on all explanatory variables through
Φ′(·) and Φ′′(·). Hence, estimates of γc are used to evaluate the standard normal density function
and its derivative. Given that this parameter depends on hc, bc, and βc, however, it does not only
7capture the eﬀect of varying degrees of factor abundance across countries, but also any other (random
and non-random) country-speciﬁc inﬂuence on individual trade policy preferences.9 Note that our
concern equally applies to a wider set of non-linear models with interaction terms.
We consider two simple and straightforward ways to circumvent the problems associated with
estimating model (3). The ﬁrst ignores the underlying latent variable framework and assumes the
probability of being in favor of free trade, conditional on all explanatory variables, to be equal to the
right-hand side of equation (3), Pr(Yic = 1|·) = γ0 +γ1 ·hic +γ2 ·hic ×hc +γc +aic. This is the linear
probability model (LPM), which comes at the cost that predictions may lie outside the unit interval.
Still, this is our preferred speciﬁcation since it explicitly estimates all ﬁxed country eﬀects, which
will be shown to explain a considerable part of the variation in trade policy preferences. Then, the
left-hand sides of (4) (evaluated at hc = 0) and (5) are equal to γ1 and γ2, respectively. Our second
approach keeps the underlying latent variable model and takes care of all arguments of γ(hc,bc,βc).
The model is then speciﬁed as
E[∆Uic|Free Trade] = γ0 + γ1 · hic + γ2 · hic × hc + γ3 · hc + aic + bc + ηic, (3’)
where ηic = αic + βc and we assume that ηic ∼ Normal(0,1). The eﬀect of individual skill is as in
equation (4), whereas the interaction eﬀect now becomes
∆2 Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic∆hc
= Φ′(·)γ2 + Φ′′(·)[γ1γ3 + γ1γ2hic + γ2γ3hc + γ2
2hichc]. (5’)
It is only this model that permits a “clean” computation of these eﬀects in a Probit framework.
In both econometric models, the eﬀect of being high-skilled on an individual’s attitude towards
free trade is a function of the economy’s human capital abundance. Hypothesis 1 suggests that high-
skilled individuals exhibit more protectionist attitudes than low-skilled individuals in labor-abundant




















c is the estimated threshold value which separates human-capital- from labor-abundant coun-
tries. Furthermore, hypothesis 2 states that a high-skilled individual’s probability of favoring free
trade is the higher, the higher his or her country’s degree of human capital abundance. A positive
cross-derivative,
∆2 Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic∆hc
> 0 (7)
9Apart from this issue, many authors have interpreted the marginal eﬀect of the interaction term as the interaction
eﬀect; see Ai & Norton (2003).
8would support this idea.
2.3 Data
We analyze the 2007 wave of the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP), an extensive internationally
comparable survey data set with detailed information on more than 40,000 individuals worldwide.
It comprises some 47 countries, 26 of which are developing countries from Latin America, Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa.10 For a combined test of hypotheses 1 and 2, the country coverage of the
survey data is particularly important. Suppose you have two regions, America and Europe. America
consists of human-capital-abundant North and labor-abundant South, and similarly for Europe with
West and East. Given that transaction costs are prohibitive for trade between America and Europe,
there is only intra-regional trade. In this world, the logic of comparative advantage predicts that
high-skilled individuals in Northern America and Western Europe are equally aﬃrmative towards
free trade. In case the estimation sample is biased towards human-capital-abundant economies, the
data could therefore lead the researcher to erroneously reject Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects on preference
formation.
We deduce an individual’s preference towards trade policy by exploiting answers to the following
question.
“What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between [respondent’s country] and
other countries – do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good thing, somewhat bad thing or a
very bad thing for our country?”
We drop all individuals who have refused to answer this question, about 5% of the entire sample,
and construct a pro-trade dummy variable Yic which takes on the value one if the respondent’s answer
is “very good” or “somewhat good” and zero otherwise. We stick to this binary coding throughout
the text since it readily eliminates any culturally driven preferences for extreme or moderate re-
sponses. These cannot be accounted for by country ﬁxed eﬀects since they come with country-speciﬁc
dispersions of trade opinions instead of mean shifts.11
A qualiﬁcation in our analysis could be that the question does not make the trade policy argument
explicit. Yet, a respondent’s skeptical view on his or her country’s engagement in international trade
can be plausibly associated only with the desire of a reduction in trade ﬂows. Since the government
is the political institution to pursue a pertinent policy, we argue that the relevant trade policy issue
10We provide summary statistics, coding information, and data sources for all variables used in this paper in appendix
A. For complementary information on the GAP survey data, see also http://pewglobal.org/.
11We have also applied alternative dummy deﬁnitions. In particular, we have assigned non-respondents to either
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Figure 1: Trade Policy Preferences and Policy Outcomes/the Stage of Development
is suﬃciently attached to the survey question.
The two pivotal variables in our econometric models are those capturing an individual’s skill level
hic and a country’s degree of human capital abundance hc. We proxy the former by an individual’s ed-
ucational background, measured through an ordered six-valued variable of educational attainment.12
We follow established literature in assuming that a higher formal education is associated with a higher
probability of being employed in a job with high skill requirements. Existing literature on individual
trade policy preferences mostly proxies a country’s degree of human capital abundance hc by its GDP
per capita. We adopt this approach as well, but we are aware of the fact that GDP per capita is
positively correlated with the quality of schooling across countries and the extent to which coun-
tries participate in intra-industry trade; see Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) and Beaulieu et al. (2011),
respectively. Both relations may alter the eﬀect of individual skill on trade policy preferences and
can thus exacerbate the analysis. Therefore, we exploit the fact that each national survey sample is
representative for the country’s population as a whole and additionally compute explicit measures of
factor abundance from within the survey data. More precisely, we deﬁne the degree of human cap-
ital abundance as each country’s weighted average of the individual skill variable.13 This procedure
guarantees the inner consistency of the empirical test to the highest possible extent.
We capture a number of further individual attributes in both the LPM and the Probit model.
In particular, we control for a respondent’s age, gender, real income, employment status, and reli-
giousness. In addition, the Probit model identiﬁes country-speciﬁc parameters on a bunch of polity
12Strictly hierarchical classes are (0) no formal education or incomplete primary education, (1) complete pri-
mary education, (2) incomplete secondary education (technical/vocational), (3) complete secondary education (techni-
cal/vocational) / incomplete secondary education (university-preparatory) / complete secondary education (university-
preparatory), (4) some university education (without degree), (5) university education (with degree).
13Sampling weights correct for deviations from random sampling.
10and demographic variables from Freedom House and the World Development Indicators (WDI), trade
openness (imports plus exports over GDP) from the Penn World Tables (PWT), human capital abun-
dance from the GAP, and GDP per capita from the WDI.14 This comes at the cost of potentially
introducing an estimation bias from omitted variables at the country level. Since the main interest of
this study is with consistent estimates of γ1 and γ2, we consider the country ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation
of the LPM to be our benchmark model.
Rodrik (1995) points out that individual trade policy preferences are an input in the political
decision process and will therefore co-determine actual trade policies. Our survey data allow for a
rough inspection of this claim. Combining information from Global Trade Alert (GTA) and the GAP
survey, ﬁgure 1(a) plots the plain count of protectionist policy measures between May 01, 2009, and
October 31, 2010, against average trade opinions in 2007 for the cross-section of 47 countries.15
The ﬁgure suggests a relationship between voting bodies’ preferences and implemented trade
policies consistent with common political economy ideas. Countries in which people hold more trade-
skeptical views tend to have governments which are more inclined towards protectionist policies. The
linear prediction shows that a one-point increase in the four-valued ordered trade opinion variable is
associated with a reduction by 50 protectionist policy measures in the considered time span. This is
more than double the median number of registered policy measures. The overall picture is consistent
with evidence from Mayda & Rodrik (2005) on the link between trade attitudes and average tariﬀs,
while drawing on a signiﬁcantly larger set of countries. A natural question is whether this relationship
becomes tighter, the more democratic a political regime is. The evidence suggests that the answer is
broadly yes; see appendix B.
Figure 1(b) unveils an important link between a country’s stage of development and people’s
attitudes towards trade. Rich countries are on average more trade-skeptical than poor countries. Pure
country-average income diﬀerences account for as much as one-ﬁfth of the variation in average trade
opinions. For example, there is very high acceptance of international trade in extremely poor African
countries such as the Senegal, Kenya, and Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. The situation is similar in Bangladesh,
which is among the least developed countries in the world, but also in emerging Asian and East-Asian
markets such as China, India, and Malaysia. Individuals in Arab and Latin American countries are
signiﬁcantly less pro-trade, while the evidence from European Union member countries is mixed with
14See tables A.3 and A.5 in the appendix for comprehensive descriptions of all variables.
15GTA is a recently established academic initiative for monitoring state policies that may detrimentally aﬀect global
trade integration in one way or the other. It is coordinated by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London,
UK. See table A.5 in the appendix for a deﬁnition of protectionist policy measures and http://www.globaltradealert.org
for more information on this data source.
11Spanish, Swedish, and Bulgarian people expressing relatively positive views and French and Italian
people being less enthusiastic. Finally, on average, U.S. citizens hold the least positive opinions
towards international trade.
3 Regression Results
Subsection 3.1 presents Probit estimates of a na¨ ıve model of free trade preferences, meaning that
it does not allow for non-linearities in the eﬀect of individual skill on trade attitudes. The two
subsequent subsections turn to estimates of equations (3) and (3’) in the LPM and the Probit model,
respectively. They reveal statistically signiﬁcant and economically large Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects on
individual trade attitudes and represent the core of our regression analysis. Subsection 3.4 evaluates
the robustness of our results across a number of alternative speciﬁcations and models. Amongst other
things, it argues that the relevance of the factor endowments model is entirely independent of other
factors such as individual economic awareness and openness towards foreign cultures and ideas.
Throughout our analysis, we estimate heteroskedastic robust standard errors to immunize in-
ference against misspeciﬁcation; see White (1980). Contrary to our approach, existing literature
computes country-cluster robust standard errors. Given our assumptions in section 2.2, stochastic
and non-stochastic country eﬀects (βc and bc) indeed induce correlation among individual observa-
tions within country clusters. Whenever we introduce country ﬁxed eﬀects, however, the γc’s capture
any such type of within-country correlation. At any rate, inference based on cluster robust standard
errors may be misleading if the number of clusters is small (< 50); see Cameron & Miller (2010).
3.1 Na¨ ıve Probit Model
Our na¨ ıve regression model does not include the interaction term between individual skill and a
country’s degree of human capital abundance, hic × hc. The main motivation for this model is
to make two sources of endogeneity visible which existing literature has not been able to address
simultaneously. The ﬁrst is omitted variable bias, and we show individual income, if excluded from
the model, to bias estimated coeﬃcients of individual skill upwards. The second has to do with
the fact that the estimation sample’s country composition exerts a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on estimated
coeﬃcients of individual skill, our main variable of interest. In particular, estimation based on a
sample excluding countries rich in raw labor (or, alternatively, rich in human capital) suﬀers from
sampling bias.
For our purposes, we split our sample of 47 countries into two subsamples. The ﬁrst covers the top
50% of countries by their GDP per capita (“higher-income countries”), the second all the remaining
countries (“lower-income countries”). Table 1 reports estimation results of the na¨ ıve model in a Probit
12framework.
Columns (1) to (4) are based on the sample with higher-income countries and report marginal
eﬀects for the average individual in the estimation sample. First and foremost, we ﬁnd a positive
and robustly signiﬁcant eﬀect of individual skill on free trade preferences. The probability of being
pro-trade increases by more than one-and-a-half percentage points for each discrete “jump” to the
next higher level of educational attainment. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant in both a statistical and an
economic sense, given that we distinguish among six education groups. Apart from individual skill,
the column (1) model explains trade attitudes by an individual’s age, gender, and a comprehensive set
of country ﬁxed eﬀects. Our results are in line with those reported in related literature. Speciﬁcally,
we ﬁnd that older and female people hold more skeptical views towards trade.
Table 1: Na¨ ıve Probit Model†
Dependent Variable: Individual-Speciﬁc Pro-Trade Dummy
Higher-Income Countries Lower-Income Countries
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.006*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Religious -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Unemployed -0.020** 0.006
(0.008) (0.007)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.019*** 0.017** 0.015** 0.015** 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 15,208 13,055 13,011 13,011 23,129 20,207 20,051 19,431
Countries 24 23 23 23 23 23 23 22
Country Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.087 0.089 0.090 0.093
† The table gives the marginal eﬀects, evaluated at estimation sample averages, for each explanatory variable on the proba-
bility of being pro-trade in a Probit model. For a comprehensive description of all individual-speciﬁc variables see table A.3
in the appendix. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%,
5%, 1% levels, respectively.
In columns (2) to (4) we successively control for individual income, religiousness, and employment
status, in addition to the other covariates. For our sample of higher-income countries, the skill eﬀect
is marginally reduced when controlling for Income in column (2). An increase in income by one
percent raises the predicted probability of being pro-trade by more than one-and-a-half percentage
points. Being tied to religious beliefs is associated with more protectionist attitudes, but the eﬀect is
quantitatively small and not statistically diﬀerent from zero. The opposite holds true for employed
people, who feature a predicted probability of favoring free trade which is two percentage points
higher than that of their unemployed peers.
Columns (5) to (8) report regression results for the sample of lower-income countries. The picture
is quite diﬀerent from that based on higher-income countries. For example, we ﬁnd an enhanced role
for individual income with a marginal eﬀect equal to three percentage points. In turn, other individual
13attributes such as religiousness, gender, and employment status are no signiﬁcant predictors for free
trade preferences. More importantly, the marginal eﬀect of individual skill loses a great deal of its
strength, even if we do not control for income; see column (5). Once we do control for it in columns
(6) to (8), it vanishes completely.
These results uncover two important points. The ﬁrst is that estimated coeﬃcients of Skill are
biased upwards if the estimation sample mostly comprises rich human capital abundant countries
(sampling bias). The second states that individual income is positively correlated with both individual
skill and free trade preferences and, if omitted from the model, results in overestimation of the skill
eﬀect (omitted variable bias).
3.2 HOS Linear Probability Model (Benchmark Regressions)
The preliminary analysis in the previous subsection suggests that the eﬀect of individual skill on free
trade preferences correlates with country characteristics. Although the results are quite in line with
the Stolper-Samuelson logic, they do not serve as a test of hypotheses 1 and 2. This test is the purpose
of this and the following subsection, exploiting the full country coverage of our sample. We ﬁrst turn
to OLS estimates of the interaction eﬀect between individual skill and a country’s degree of human
capital abundance, as in equation (3).16
Table 2 contrasts the results of two slightly diﬀerent approaches, the ﬁrst of which interacts
individual skill hic with a country’s GDP per capita, a proxy variable for human capital abundance
hc; see columns (1) to (4). Our second approach applies a country’s weighted mean of individual skill
as an explicit and therefore more reliable measure of relative factor endowments; see columns (5) to
(8). Intentionally, this entire strategy includes the possibility of obtaining diﬀering results for the two
applied measures, which would cast some doubt on the conclusions drawn in previous studies.
We ﬁnd, however, contrary evidence. Throughout all speciﬁcations employed, the estimated co-
eﬃcient of individual skill has a negative sign while that of the interaction term is positive. The
estimation outcome is robust (in a qualitative sense) to using alternative measures of human capital
abundance, controlling for individual income and including other individual-level covariates such as
religiousness and employment status. Our estimates suggest that the eﬀect of individual skill is an
increasing function of a country’s degree of human capital abundance. In accordance with hypotheses
1 and 2, high-skilled individuals are more likely to favor free trade than low-skilled individuals, but
only if they live in countries with suﬃciently high relative levels of human capital. By contrast,
16Throughout most of our regression analysis, the linear models predict probabilities of being pro-trade outside the
closed unit interval for about half a percent of all estimation sample observations. Whenever outside the unit interval,
predictions exceed one, but only by a marginal amount.
14in labor-abundant economies it is the low-skilled people who are more inclined towards free trade,
other things equal. Our evidence substantially strengthens the ﬁndings in Mayda & Rodrik (2005),
Scheve & Slaughter (2006), and O’Rourke (2006), because it is based on a “clean” estimation of the
interaction eﬀect, explicit endowment information, and a novel extensive data set.
Table 2: HOS Linear Probability Model†
Dependent Variable: Individual-Speciﬁc Pro-Trade Dummy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill -0.057*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.018*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Skill × 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008***
GDP Per Capita (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Skill × 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
Country Mean of Skill (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Religious -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Unemployed -0.008 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005)
Age -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.009** 0.008** 0.007* 0.007 0.009** 0.008* 0.007 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 37,859 33,262 33,062 32,442 38,337 33,262 33,062 32,442
Countries 46 46 46 45 47 46 46 45
Country Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.068 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.068
† The table gives the marginal eﬀects for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro-trade in a linear probabil-
ity model. For a comprehensive description of all individual-speciﬁc variables see table A.3 in the appendix. Heteroskedastic
robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
To fully grasp the estimation outcome, it is helpful to plot the marginal eﬀect of individual skill
on the probability of being pro-trade against a country’s relative endowment with human capital.
Figure 2 visualizes
\ ∆Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic
= ˆ γ1 + ˆ γ2 · hc (8)
as well as the 90% conﬁdence intervals for the regressions that correspond to columns (4) and (8)
in table 2. The left-hand ﬁgure (with GDP per capita as a proxy for human capital abundance)
demonstrates that in countries with relatively low incomes per capita the model predicts a negative
skill eﬀect on the probability of favoring free trade. In Ethiopia, the poorest country in the sample, a
one-point increase in individual skill exerts a negative and signiﬁcant impact on free trade preferences
in the vicinity of one-and-a-half percentage points. In suﬃciently rich countries the eﬀect is in turn
positive and statistically signiﬁcant, considerably exceeding two percentage points for the countries at
the upper extreme of the world income distribution. The threshold value separating countries with a
predicted positive eﬀect of Skill from those where it is negative is at a log GDP per capita of around
8 (≈ 3,000 Int. Dollars), and therefore signiﬁcantly below the threshold value that we employed to
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Figure 2: The Marginal Eﬀect of Skill hic as a Function of hc (LPM Estimates)
Similarly, our preferred estimates with explicit endowment information (right-hand ﬁgure) again
fully support hypotheses 1 and 2. The marginal eﬀect of individual skill has a positive sign for
countries with a weighted mean of that variable above h∗
c = 2 and a negative sign for countries
below that threshold. Strikingly, in Morocco and Tanzania, individuals with the highest skill level
(university eduction with degree) feature a predicted probability of opposing free trade which is almost
seven percentage points higher than that of an individual with the lowest skill level (no formal or
incomplete primary education), other things equal. In the U.S., on the other end of the distribution
of human capital abundance, the skill eﬀect runs into the opposite direction: going from the lowest
to the highest skill level increases an individual’s predicted probability of being in favor of free trade
by twelve percentage points. In countries with intermediate degrees of human capital abundance, the
model predicts a zero-eﬀect on individual trade preferences for a given change in individual skill.
3.3 HOS Probit Model
We now evaluate the robustness of the above ﬁndings in a Probit framework. Since the Probit
model does no longer allow us to include country ﬁxed eﬀects, two threats to valid inference arise.
First, omitted variables at the country level (contributing to bc) could render parameter estimates
inconsistent. Second, stochastic and (unobserved components of) non-stochastic country eﬀects (βc
and bc) in the error term cast doubt on the validity of ordinary and heteroskedastic robust standard
errors alike. We tackle this problem by assigning each country to one out of a total of eight world
regions and controlling for eﬀects common to all countries located in the same world region. These
regions are Northern America, Southern America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Northern Africa,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the Middle East; see table A.5 in the appendix.
16Table 3: HOS Probit Model†
Dependent Variable: Individual-Speciﬁc Pro-Trade Dummy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Skill × 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
GDP Per Capita (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Skill × 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
Country Mean of Skill (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Religious -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Unemployed -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.005) (0.005)
Age -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.010** 0.009** 0.007* 0.006 0.010*** 0.009** 0.007 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP Per Capita -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Country Mean of Skill -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.042***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Electoral Process 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Political Pluralism & -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.032***
Participation (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Functioning of 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.018***
Government (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Freedom of Speech & -0.005** -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005** -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
Belief (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Associational & 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.036***
Organizational Rights (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rule of Law 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Personal Autonomy & -0.009*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.005* -0.005* -0.008***
Individual Rights (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Trade Openness 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Labor Force Share 0.242*** 0.319*** 0.310*** 0.322*** 0.222*** 0.303*** 0.293*** 0.326***
(0.047) (0.052) (0.052) (0.061) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052) (0.061)
Observations 37,111 32,545 32,354 31,734 37,111 32,545 32,354 31,734
Countries 45 45 45 44 45 45 45 44
Region Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.052 0.052 0.050 0.051 0.053
† The table gives the marginal eﬀects, evaluated at estimation sample averages, for each explanatory variable on the probability
of being pro-trade in a Probit model. Row (1) evaluates the marginal eﬀect of Skill at hc = 0 and at estimation sample aver-
ages of all other covariates. Similarly, reported marginal eﬀects of GDP Per Capita and Country Mean of Skill are evaluated
at hic = 0 when interacted with Skill. For comprehensive descriptions of all variables see tables A.3 and A.5 in the appendix.
Region-ﬁxed eﬀects refer to world regions as in table A.4 in the appendix. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in
parentheses. *,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3 reports marginal and interaction eﬀects, computed from parameter estimates of variants of
equation (3’) and evaluated at estimation sample averages of all covariates.17 As before, columns (1)
to (4) and (5) to (8) employ diﬀerent speciﬁcations in which Skill is interacted with GDP Per Capita
and Country Mean of Skill, respectively. The model again reveals a non-linearity in the relationship
between individual skill and free trade preferences consistent with distributional predictions of free
trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. In human-capital-abundant countries high-skilled
17To facilitate comparison across tables 2 and 3, row (1) instead evaluates the marginal eﬀect of Skill at hc = 0 and at
estimation sample averages of all other covariates. Similarly, reported marginal eﬀects of GDP Per Capita and Country
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Figure 3: The Marginal Eﬀect of Skill hic as a Function of hc (Probit Estimates)
individuals hold on average less protectionist attitudes than low-skilled individuals, and vice versa in
labor-abundant countries. Yet, the eﬀects are diﬀerent in strength to those in the LPM, at least for
cases in which the interaction term is based on a country’s GDP per capita.
Such diﬀerences can conveniently be identiﬁed through inspection of ﬁgures 3(a) and 3(b), which
show
\ ∆Pr(Yic = 1|·)
∆hic
= Φ′(ˆ γ0 + ˆ γ1 · ¯ hic + ˆ γ2 · ¯ hic × hc + ˆ γ3 · hc + \ a(¯ Xic) + [ b(¯ Zc))[ˆ γ1 + ˆ γ2 · hc], (8’)
for the interaction with GDP Per Capita and, alternatively, Country Mean of Skill; see the cor-
responding regression results in columns (4) and (8), respectively. In equation (8’) ‘bars’ indicate
estimation sample averages and bold letters represent vectors.
Both ﬁgures show that the marginal eﬀect of individual skill on free trade preferences increases
with a country’s relative endowment with human capital. They can therefore be interpreted as
lending support to hypothesis 2. However, in ﬁgure 3(a) the interval of GDP Per Capita for which
the model predicts a negative skill eﬀect is substantially reduced. Where this eﬀect applies, it is also
smaller than in the LPM and at most marginally signiﬁcant. Overall, the ﬁgure suggests positive and
economically large skill eﬀects for the overwhelming majority of countries in the sample. This stands
in contrast to the corresponding ﬁgure in the LPM. We suggest that this highlights the importance
of (i) unobserved country eﬀects, which will only partly be captured by the region ﬁxed eﬀects and
(ii) the nature of the proxy variable. This second argument follows from ﬁgure 3(b) which largely
reproduces ﬁgure 2(b) in a non-linear fashion. The data therefore support both hypotheses as soon
as we employ explicit information on countries’ relative factor endowments.
Our polity and demographic variables also carry some interesting implications. Each of these
variables reﬂects aspects of a country’s political, institutional, and social setting. Although we think
it is natural to assume the formation of policy preferences to be partly governed by this setting, the
18precise channels through which this occurs are largely unclear. The same holds true, obviously, for
their directions of inﬂuence. Estimation results in table 3 show most such country characteristics
to be signiﬁcant predictors of individual attitudes towards trade. For example, better functioning
governments and better associational and organizational rights are associated with more favorable
views on trade. The opposite holds true for higher degrees of political pluralism and participation as
well as personal autonomy and individual rights. These ﬁndings corroborate our view that further
research is needed to better understand why free trade preferences respond diﬀerently to diﬀerent
aspects of the institutional architecture in which states and countries are embedded. An interesting
step into this direction can be found in Ehrlich (2007).
3.4 Robustness Analysis
Our robustness analysis is based on the LPM and comes in three parts. Subsection 3.4.1 takes care of
further individual characteristics, all of which could be correlated with both educational attainment
and free trade preferences. In subsection 3.4.2, we address the rather general concern that individuals’
policy preferences are rarely driven by economic self-interest. Finally, subsection 3.4.3 asks whether
our results are simple artifacts of our coding choice for skill hic.
3.4.1 Conditioning on Aspects of Individual Enlightenment
Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) argue that education is not a “clean” device for factor ownership, be-
cause it could (i) spur people’s awareness of the aggregate gains from trade and (ii) make individuals
less amenable to nationalist ideas; see also Mayda & Rodrik (2005).18 To the extent that these aspects
of individual “enlightenment” have a relevant impact on preference formation, our model could suﬀer
from omitted variable bias, provided their eﬀect is not already absorbed by other controls. However,
this bias would apply equally to all countries, at least in principle. Hence, our previous estimation
results may overstate the positive eﬀect of skill in human-capital-abundant countries such as the
United States and, by the same token, understate the negative eﬀect of skill in labor-abundant coun-
tries such as Tanzania. These considerations reinforce rather than contradict our Stolper-Samuelson
interpretation.
In our regressions in table 4, we aim at conditioning on aspects of both people’s economic awareness
and their openness towards foreign cultures and habits. Provided that stated free trade preferences
are also correlated with expected individual income eﬀects of trade, our model then consistently
18The ﬁrst aspect is a particularly serious concern in our application, because the question on trade preferences
does not address the distributional consequences of international trade within the respondent’s country, but rather the
implications for the country at large; see also Mansﬁeld & Mutz (2009). From this perspective, free trade in goods and
services may be the ﬁrst best policy choice.
19identiﬁes any Stolper-Samuelson forces. Many of the additional individual-speciﬁc controls are not
applicable for a subset of eight countries in the GAP survey data set. This subset includes Canada,
the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
United States. To exclude the possibility that changes in estimated coeﬃcients reﬂect mere changes
in sample composition, we employ exactly the same estimation sample in all speciﬁcations. The most
parsimonious model in column (1) explains free trade preferences by an individual’s income, age,
gender, skill and its interaction with Country Mean of Skill.19 This baseline model largely reproduces
the full-sample estimates of the previous subsections, even though the magnitude of Stolper-Samuelson
eﬀects is somewhat reduced.
Table 4: Conditioning on Aspects of Individual Enlightenment†
Dependent Variable: Individual-Speciﬁc Pro-Trade Dummy
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Skill × 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
Country Mean of Skill (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Income 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)




Sociotropic Views 0.010*** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
Fears of -0.025*** -0.021***
Cultural Spill-Overs (0.005) (0.005)
Nationalism 0.007** 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)
Fears of -0.074*** -0.072***
Internt’l Competition (0.007) (0.007)
Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 22,378 22,378 22,378 22,378 22,378 22,378 22,378 22,378
Countries 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Country Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.077 0.080
† The table gives the marginal eﬀects for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro-trade in a linear probabil-
ity model. For a comprehensive description of all individual-speciﬁc variables see table A.3 in the appendix. Heteroskedastic
robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
In column (2), we add a four-valued ordered proxy variable to capture an individual’s economic
understanding, which could make individuals responsive to the aggregate gains from trade (Economic
Awareness). The survey design confronts respondents with a statement which, we believe, calls for an
aﬃrmative reply of a person with some training in economics: “Please tell me whether you completely
agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statement. ‘Most people
19To economize on space, we do not report regression output for estimations in which we interact individual skill with
GDP Per Capita instead of Country Mean of Skill. The results allow us to draw fully identical conclusions and are
available from the authors upon request.
20are better oﬀ in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.’” The
statement nicely encapsulates a basic principle of economics: that “free markets are usually a good
way to organize economic activity” but that they “can nonetheless leave sizable disparities in economic
well-being.”20 Moreover, it does not refer to issues such as international trade, trade liberalization,
or globalization, at least not explicitly. Answers to this question are thus not subject to what has
been dubbed justiﬁcation bias in the literature on opinion polls. This type of bias would arise if
individuals were partly using their answers as a means of ex post justiﬁcation for their (positive or
negative) preferences towards trade; see Bonsall et al. (1992). Economic Awareness enters the model
with a signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient, as expected. Its quantitative relevance is relatively high.
Going from the answer category with the lowest value (0 =“completely disagree”) to that with the
highest value (3 =“completely agree”), an individual’s probability of favoring free trade increases by
four-and-a-half percentage points.
Column (3) inspects the role of information in attitude formation. Mansﬁeld & Mutz (2009)
discuss the possibility that highly educated individuals are more likely to be exposed to relevant
information on the (aggregate) economic eﬀects of trade policies. We include a measure of an indi-
vidual’s exposure to international news (Informed). This variable is based on the following survey
question: “Which of the following two statements best describes you: ‘I follow INTERNATIONAL
news closely ONLY when something important is happening.’ OR ‘I follow INTERNATIONAL news
closely most of the time, whether or not something important is happening’?” Our assumption is
that following international news regularly, independent of whether or not something important is
happening, increases an individual’s exposure to relevant information (Informed coded one). In line
with arguments brought forward in the literature, the variable is indeed positively correlated with an
individual’s skill level; see table A.2 in the appendix. Yet, our regression results suggest that exposure
to information does not exert any signiﬁcant impact on trade policy preferences.
In the spirit of Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006), Mansﬁeld & Mutz (2009) argue that material self-
interest is less important for trade attitudes than perceptions of the eﬀects of trade on the economy
as a whole. We will try to take care of a similar concern below. Here we ask whether the extent
to which individuals hold sociotropic views makes a diﬀerence for perceptions of international trade.
An individual’s answer to the following survey question may yield informative insights in this regard:
“Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree
with the following statement. ‘Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes
20The quotations are respectively from Mankiw (2008, pp. 8 & 12), one of the most widely used introductory economics
textbooks.
21slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.’” The variable Sociotropic Views takes on integer
values from (0) “completely disagree” to (3) “completely agree”. The underlying statement posits a
trade-oﬀ between environmental protection, a durable public good generating beneﬁts for many years,
and economic growth and the availability of jobs, the latter securing personal income. We argue that a
tendency towards environmental protection reveals sociotropic attitudes. Regression results in column
(4) are consistent with this interpretation, reporting a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of Sociotropic
Views.
We next turn to aspects of nationalist attitudes. Column (5) controls for fears that increasing
globalization may crowd out local traditions. We exploit the following survey information: “I am
going to read some phrases which have opposite meanings. Tell me which comes closer to describing
your views. ‘It’s good that American ideas and customs are spreading around the world.’ — ‘It’s
bad that American ideas and customs are spreading around the world.’” The dichotomous variable
Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs is coded one (zero) if respondents take a positive (negative) stance on
spreading American ideas and customs. Obviously, answers to this question are heavily loaded by the
explicit reference to the United States. Our data show that anti-American sentiments are popular
in both developing and developed countries. That said, we argue that our indicator variable also
captures fears of the cultural impact of globalization in general, and we expect the purely American-
speciﬁc element to be independent of individual trade policy preferences. The negative and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient of Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs shows that pro-trade views go hand in hand with openness
towards foreign cultures and habits. Again, this is in line with our expectations.
Column (6) incorporates feelings of national superiority through a four-valued ordered variable
constructed from individual responses towards the following statement (Nationalism): “As I read
another list of statements, for each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree,
mostly disagree or completely disagree with it. ‘Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior
to others.’” Our estimates reveal that “nationalist” people are, at ﬁrst sight surprisingly, more likely
to be pro-trade. This ﬁnding runs opposite to the intuition that nationalist sentiments should foster
preferences for isolationist policies. On the other hand, feelings of national superiority may mitigate
worries that the domestic economy is not able to cope with foreign competition. Seen in this light,
the positive albeit small coeﬃcient estimate on Nationalism is quite intuitive.
The model in column (7) takes a closer look at the extent to which individuals are afraid of negative
economy-wide eﬀects from international competition. The binary variable Fears of International
Competition is based on the following survey question: “Turning to China, overall do you think that
China’s growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing for our country?” Including this variable in
22the model is diﬀerent from controlling for economic awareness, since there are arguments for both why
economic growth of one country may be good or bad for another country. Nevertheless, we expect
people who perceive another country’s growth as a threat rather than an opportunity to be more
likely to retain protectionist attitudes. Our results strikingly conﬁrm this expectation. Individuals
who fear negative repercussions from China’s growing economy have a signiﬁcantly lower probability
of favoring free trade. The quantitative impact is huge and amounts to a fall in predicted probability
of more than seven percentage points.
We have so far separately augmented the model by each of the above mentioned control variables
in columns (2) to (7). All qualitative results survive if we estimate a more encompassing model which
conditions on all aspects of individual enlightenment simultaneously; see column (8). These ﬁndings
are interesting in their own right. They give quite strong support to the idea that various aspects
of individual enlightenment exist, and that most of them are signiﬁcantly linked to individual trade
policy preferences. However, our main focus is on parameter estimates for Skill and its interaction
with Country Mean of Skill. These do not change in any signiﬁcant way, relative to the baseline
speciﬁcation in column (1). We therefore conclude that the Stolper-Samuelson result is independent
of individuals’ economic awareness and their openness towards foreign cultures and ideas.
3.4.2 Economic Self-Interest versus Social Values and Identity
There is an ongoing debate among economists, sociologists, and political scientists about the roles
played by social values and identity and, juxtaposed, pure material self-interest in shaping individual
political behavior. The literature as it currently stands takes the view that both factors are potentially
important, depending on how clear-cut the policy alternatives and implications are and how long the
time horizon is to which these apply; see Chong et al. (2001), Ehrlich et al. (2010), and Hunt et al.
(2010) as well as the references cited there. Admittedly, this paper takes an extreme view on this
issue. Recall that a prerequisite for free trade preferences to emerge along the lines of the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson model is that individuals prefer a certain policy choice over another if it brings
about a greater (expected) personal income. Given the nature of our survey data, we are not in a
position to fully assess the reliability of this prerequisite. Yet, we can make an important step into
this direction. The point of departure is the idea that in individual decision making the weight put on
material self-interest is larger for some individuals than for others. We expect this weight to broadly
correlate with the extent to which hypotheses 1 and 2 are borne out by the data. The challenge is to
ﬁnd a sound signalling device from which we can systematically exploit this heterogeneity. Our view
is that the absence of economic and ﬁnancial concerns is such a device because it erodes the need for
23individuals to base their decisions on mere pocketbook considerations.
Our strategy is to divide the entire sample into two groups, the ﬁrst of which includes only indi-
viduals who express economic and/or ﬁnancial concerns and the second all the remaining individuals.
This distinction is based on answers to the following question in the GAP survey: “What do you
think is the most important problem facing you and your family today?” The question is open in the
sense that pollers do not present or read out a list with possible answers to individuals. A maxi-
mum of three answers is allowed, and each of them is subsequently assigned to one of the following
categories: “Economic/ﬁnancial problems”, “Health”, “Education and children”, “Housing”, “Social
relations”, “Work”, “Transportation”, “Crime”, “Problems related to government”, “Terrorism and
war”, “Other”. Each category comprises two to six pre-speciﬁed subcategories plus a “residual” group
for answers which do not ﬁt into any one of the given subcategories. We identify subcategories refer-
ring to problems which are relevant from a very economic/ﬁnancial perspective and classify individuals
whose answers fall into at least one such subcategory as “economically/ﬁnancially concerned”. These
subcategories are “Low wages”, “Unemployment”, “Poverty”, “Other economic/ﬁnancial problems”,
and “Lack of good jobs”.
Table 5: Economic Self-Interest versus Social Values and Identity†
Dependent Variable: Individual-Speciﬁc Pro-Trade Dummy
“Economically/Financially Concerned” “Economically/Financially Unconcerned”
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill -0.017** -0.015** -0.015** -0.022*** -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Skill × 0.008** 0.007** 0.007** 0.009** 0.007** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007*
Country Mean of Skill (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Income 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Religious -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.012 -0.012 -0.016*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Unemployed 0.003 0.007 -0.008 -0.008
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 17,136 16,655 16,538 12,575 12,303 12,160 12,094 9,272
Countries 38 37 37 37 38 37 37 37
Country Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No Yes No No No Yes
R2 0.057 0.059 0.059 0.081 0.068 0.069 0.070 0.093
† The table gives the marginal eﬀects for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro-trade in a linear prob-
ability model. Additional controls are Economic Awareness, Informed, Sociotropic Views, Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs,
Nationalism and Fears of Internt’l Competition. For a comprehensive description of all individual-speciﬁc variables see
table A.3 in the appendix. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** denote signiﬁcance
at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
With this procedure, we are left with roughly 20,000 individual observations with economic and/or
ﬁnancial concerns and 15,000 without. One might be tempted to expect the skill distribution to draw
a sharp line between the two groups of individuals, but the evidence proves contrary. For example,
close to one sixth of individuals who express economic and/or ﬁnancial concerns have exposure to
24at least some university education, as opposed to 23 percent for the other group. We run the same
regressions separately on each of the two subsamples, estimating the eﬀect of Skill and its interaction
with Country Mean of Skill and bringing in diﬀerent sets of control variables; see table 5. As in the
previous subsection, answers to the above survey question are not applicable for a relevant subset
of countries in the GAP. Thus, we again end up with a maximum number of 38 countries in the
estimation sample.
We ﬁnd the estimates based on the sample with “economically/ﬁnancially concerned” individuals
to neatly reﬂect the Stolper-Samuelson logic; see columns (1) to (4). The quantitative implications are
similar to those in the previous subsection, at least for models in which we use the same set of control
variables as in our benchmark regressions. Column (4) applies a speciﬁcation similar to that in column
(8) of table 4, controlling for all aspects of individual enlightenment. In this model, the predicted
negative skill eﬀect extends to a larger set of countries, compared to our benchmark regressions in
section 3.2. This set now includes labor-abundant China, for example. Estimates on the subsample
with individuals who do not express economic and/or ﬁnancial concerns, while similar with respect
to all control variables, yield complementary insights; see columns (5) to (8). In particular, the data
do not conﬁrm hypothesis 1 as there is no country in the sample for which a given positive change
in Skill entails a signiﬁcant decline in individual support for free trade. A careful interpretation
of these ﬁndings could be that the factor endowments model has signiﬁcant explanatory power in
understanding trade attitudes of individuals whose concerns about their personal ﬁnancial situation
loom large in their preference structures. With other factors such as social values and identity gaining
relative importance in individual decision making, this explanatory power is reduced.
3.4.3 Skill Group-Speciﬁc Eﬀects on Free Trade Preferences
To assess whether and to what extent our previous results are due to the speciﬁc coding of Skill and
Country Mean of Skill, we estimate the same model for alternative measures of both individual skill
and a country’s relative endowment with human capital. In so doing, we pay attention to the fact
that values on Skill reﬂect an ordinal instead of a cardinal scale. Indeed, there is no quantiﬁable
distance between any two educational categories, although the variable deﬁnition suggests there is
(and that it is the same between any two adjacent categories).
We ﬁrst allow for skill group-speciﬁc eﬀects on free trade preferences. By skill groups we mean
groups of individuals with the same educational background, where we represent each of the six
strictly hierarchical classes of educational attainment by a unique skill group, enumerated from zero
to ﬁve. Individual-speciﬁc indicator variables Skill Group 1 to Skill Group 5 then take on the value
25one if the individual belongs to the corresponding skill group and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and
(2) in table 6 report estimation results for regressions in which we employ these indicator variables
and their interactions with Country Mean of Skill as exogenous variables. Individuals with no formal
or incomplete primary education (Skill Group 0) form the omitted category against which estimated
skill group-speciﬁc eﬀects and the interactions are to be interpreted. In light of hypotheses 1 and 2 we
expect each skill group eﬀect on free trade preferences to exhibit the same qualitative non-linearity
as above: compared to the lowest skill group, any other skill group should have a lower probability of
favoring free trade in labor-abundant economies and a higher probability in human-capital-abundant
countries. Furthermore, the quantitative implications (both positive and negative) should be the
larger in absolute size, the higher the skill group category of educational attainment. This follows
from the assumption that the probability of holding a high-skilled occupation is the higher, the higher
the skill category.
Table 6: Skill Group-Speciﬁc Eﬀects on Free Trade Preferences†
Dependent Variable: Individual-Speciﬁc Pro-Trade Dummy
Interaction Terms with Interaction Terms with
hc = Country Mean of Skill hc = Country Median of Skill
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Skill Group 1 0.024 -0.006 0.024 0.003
(0.032) (0.036) (0.022) (0.024)
Skill Group 2 -0.029 -0.030 -0.026 -0.025
(0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (0.029)
Skill Group 3 -0.035 -0.070** -0.015 -0.040*
(0.025) (0.028) (0.019) (0.021)
Skill Group 4 -0.045 -0.094** -0.045 -0.082**
(0.038) (0.041) (0.035) (0.037)
Skill Group 5 -0.082*** -0.132*** -0.115*** -0.136***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.029) (0.031)
Skill Group 1 × hc -0.011 -0.002 -0.010 -0.006
(0.016) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011)
Skill Group 2 × hc 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.013
(0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
Skill Group 3 × hc 0.026** 0.033** 0.015* 0.018*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
Skill Group 4 × hc 0.038** 0.047*** 0.036*** 0.039***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
Skill Group 5 × hc 0.054*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.061***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
Income 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.003) (0.003)
Age -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.008** 0.008* 0.008** 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 38,337 33,262 38,337 33,262
Countries 47 46 47 46
Country Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.066
† The table gives the marginal eﬀects for each explanatory variable on the probability of being pro-trade in a lin-
ear probability model. Baseline category: Skill Group 0. For a comprehensive description of all individual-speciﬁc
variables see table A.3 in the appendix. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,***
denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
Indeed, point estimates of the coeﬃcients in table 6 suggest that the main eﬀects of all skill
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Figure 4: Skill Group-Speciﬁc Eﬀects on Free Trade Preferences
the model are reinforced once Income is controlled for. Importantly, both main and interaction eﬀects
are increasing (in absolute size) in the skill group category of educational attainment, and they are
statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent conﬁdence level in case of the top three categories. Figure
4 makes visible how the skill group eﬀects vary with a country’s relative endowment with human
capital. It shows that the threshold value of relative factor abundance is strikingly similar for the
top four skill groups (h∗
c ≈ 2). Furthermore, the straight lines depicting predicted changes in trade
attitudes rotate left around this threshold value for higher levels of educational attainment.21 We
therefore interpret the results of this more ﬂexible estimation approach as fully compatible with the
Stolper-Samuelson logic.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, in columns (3) and (4) in table 6 we interact skill group dummy
variables with the country median of Skill instead of the country average. We do so because the
median may be more suitable for data on an ordinal scale and because it is less sensitive to outliers.
The use of this measure does not alter our estimation results in any remarkable way.
4 Conclusion
Motivated by the incidence of the growing North-South share in world trade and the rising demand for
protection in high-income countries, this paper adds an empirical piece to the literature on individual
attitudes towards trade. Using a wide cross section of 47 countries from all over the world, we
primarily focus on the interplay between individual factor ownership and countries’ relative factor
21Given that the model predicts a zero-eﬀect for Skill Group 1, irrespective of a country’s relative endowment with
human capital, we conclude that the probability to qualify for a high-skilled job does not diﬀer across Skill Group 0 and
Skill Group 1. Similarly for Skill Group 2.
27endowments. Our paper shows how the linear probability model can be used to straightforwardly
examine how this interplay is shaping free trade preferences, and that this approach has relevant
advantages over the commonly applied Probit model.
Our evidence suggests that the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, one of the most inﬂuential
models in the theory of international trade, has a signiﬁcant stake in explaining the formation of
trade policy preference at the individual level. Stolper-Samuelson-type distributional eﬀects of trade
policy interventions account for a signiﬁcant share of the heterogeneity of free trade preferences across
individuals and countries both in statistical and economic terms. In the United States, being high-
skilled increases an individual’s predicted probability of favoring free trade by up to twelve percentage
points. In Ethiopia, the eﬀect amounts to eight percentage points, but in exactly the opposite
direction. Our results derive from a novel survey data set, and they are robust to conditioning on
aspects of individual enlightenment. Our analysis shows, however, that these aspects are signiﬁcant
predictors of preferences towards trade. For example, individuals are more open to international
trade, the higher their economic awareness. The opposite applies to people with reservations against
foreign cultures and international competition. These ﬁndings corroborate part of the conclusions
drawn by Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) and Mansﬁeld & Mutz (2009), but not at the expense of a
rejection of the factor endowments model.
The empirical support for the factor endowments model may appear puzzling, given that the
neoclassical assumptions are obviously false. The fact that economists have long struggled with
bringing the Heckscher-Ohlin model to actual trading data in a meaningful way only reinforces this
argument. That said, our empirical analysis does prove that an individual’s revealed preference
towards trade policy includes an element which is responsive to the relative abundance of his or her
production factor in the domestic economy. This element turns out to shape attitudes towards trade
policies in a way that exactly mirrors the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. This
result becomes elucidating if interpreted against the notion of factors being embodied in trade goods
and services. Broadly speaking, it tells us that people are sensitive towards how an integrated world
economy may aﬀect the relative scarcity of their factors, compared to an autarky situation.
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A Individual and Country Data
This appendix provides summary statistics, coding information, and data sources for all variables
used in this paper.
Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Individual-Level Variables†
Arithmetic Standard
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Pro-Trade Dummy 38,684 0.86 0.34 0 1
Trade Opinion 38,684 2.19 0.75 0 3
Skill 40,637 2.50 1.56 0 5
Income 35,131 6.16 1.60 -0.55 9.81
Religious 39,826 0.62 0.49 0 1
Unemployed 40,515 0.34 0.47 0 1
Age 40,614 39.57 15.55 18 97
Male 40,826 0.49 0.50 0 1
Economic Awareness 33,978 1.86 0.92 0 3
Informed 38,842 0.54 0.50 0 1
Sociotropic Views 34,713 2.02 0.90 0 3
Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs 35,712 0.70 0.46 0 1
Nationalism 34,807 2.03 0.86 0 3
Fears of International Competition 30,987 0.28 0.45 0 1
† See table A.3 for coding information on all variables. Summary statistics are not corrected for deviations from random sam-
pling.
ITable A.2: Correlation Matrix: Aspects of Individual Enlightenment†
Fears of Fears of
Cultural Internt’l
Economic Sociotropic Spill- Compe-
Skill Awareness Informed Views Overs Nationalism tition
Skill 1.000
Economic Awareness 0.019 1.000
Informed 0.055 -0.025 1.000
Sociotropic Views 0.025 0.193 0.018 1.000
Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs -0.067 -0.087 0.009 -0.012 1.000
Nationalism -0.034 0.058 -0.026 0.107 0.038 1.000
Fears of Internt’l Competition 0.057 -0.042 0.001 -0.006 0.094 0.024 1.000
† The table gives correlation coeﬃcients based on the estimation sample in table 4. For a comprehensive description of all
variables see table A.3.
Table A.3: Coding Information for Individual-Level Data†
Variable Description and Coding (Survey Questions in Italics)
Pro-Trade Dummy “What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between [respondent’s country] and other
countries – do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for
our country?”; coded (1) “very good” or “somewhat good”, (0) “somewhat bad” or “very bad”.
Trade Opinion Survey question as above; coded (3) “very good”, (2) “somewhat good”, (1) “somewhat bad”, and (0)
“very bad”.
Age Respondent’s age in years.
Male Coded (1) male, (0) female.
Skill Respondent’s educational attainment. Coded (0) no formal or incomplete primary education, (1) com-
plete primary education, (2) incomplete secondary education (technical/vocational), (3) complete sec-
ondary education (technical/vocational) / incomplete secondary education (university-preparatory) /
complete secondary education (university-preparatory), (4) some university education (without degree),
and (5) university education (with degree). Skill Group dummy variables (1 to 5) represent the top ﬁve
categories of educational attainment, each capturing a single category in a binary way. There is some
cross-country heterogeneity in the survey categories of educational attainment. More information on
how we map country-speciﬁc groups of educational attainment into the above hierarchical structure is
available upon request.
Income Log of monthly real income. Survey respondents sort themselves into income groups, based on (country-
speciﬁc) lists of incomes. As a general rule, we compute individual income as the middle value of the
income interval chosen by the individual, adjusted by PPP conversion factors from the World Devel-
opment Indicators, expressed in logs, and, if necessary, converted to a monthly basis. More detailed
information on this procedure is available upon request.
Unemployed Coded (1) unemployed/not employed, (0) employed.
Religious “Which one of these comes closest to your opinion, number 1 or number 2?”; coded (1) “Number 2 –
It is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values”/NA/refused, (0) “Number
1 – It is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values”.
Economic Awareness “Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree
with the following statement. ‘Most people are better oﬀ in a free market economy, even though some
people are rich and some are poor’”; coded (0) “completely disagree”, (1) “disagree”, (2) “agree”, (3)
“completely agree”.
Informed “Which of the following two statements best describes you: ‘I follow INTERNATIONAL news closely
ONLY when something important is happening’ OR ‘I follow INTERNATIONAL news closely most of
the time, whether or not something important is happening’?”; coded (1) “Most of the time, whether
or not something important is happening”, (0) “Only when something important is happening”.
Sociotropic Views “Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with
the following statement. ‘Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower
economic growth and some loss of jobs.’”; coded (0) “completely disagree”, (1) “mostly disagree”, (2)
“mostly agree”, (3) “completely agree”.
Fears of Cultural
Spill-Overs
“I am going to read some phrases which have opposite meanings. Tell me which comes closer to de-
scribing your views.”; coded (1) “It’s bad that American ideas and customs are spreading around the
world”, (0) “It’s good that American ideas and customs are spreading around the world”.
Nationalism “As I read another list of statements, for each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly
agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with it. ‘Our people are not perfect, but our culture is




“Turning to China, overall do you think that China’s growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing
for our country?”; coded (1) “bad thing”, (0) “good thing”.
† See table A.1 for summary statistics on all variables. All information come from the GAP survey data.
IITable A.4: Country-Level Information†
Country Mean of GDP Per Capita Country Mean Country Median
Country Observations Pro-Trade
Dummy
(in Logs) of Skill of Skill
Asia
China 2,998 0.96 8.41 2.01 3
Pakistan 1,728 0.95 7.74 1.69 2
Malaysia 670 0.95 9.41 2.47 3
India 1,988 0.92 7.78 3.65 3
Bangladesh 986 0.91 7.02 1.63 2
South Korea 681 0.90 10.01 3.70 3
Indonesia 949 0.75 8.12 2.26 3
Japan 683 0.80 10.34 3.34 3
Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 461 0.95 9.21 2.95 3
Ukraine 478 0.94 8.70 3.48 3
Russia 941 0.87 9.45 2.95 3
Slovakia 440 0.85 9.75 3.06 3
Poland 468 0.83 9.57 2.49 2
Czech Republic 446 0.80 9.97 2.94 3
Middle East
Kuwait 481 0.95 3.61 3
Israel 865 0.93 10.06 3.60 3
Lebanon 972 0.85 9.15 2.58 3
Turkey 830 0.85 9.01 1.97 1
Jordan 974 0.74 8.41 1.74 1
Palestinian Territories 771 0.72 8.16 2.83 3
Northern Africa
Morocco 864 0.80 8.24 1.16 0
Egypt 957 0.63 8.48 1.74 2
Northern America
Canada 485 0.85 10.48 3.48 3
USA 964 0.63 10.66 3.66 4
Rest of Africa
Senegal 694 0.96 7.34 1.45 1
Ghana 662 0.95 7.10 2.37 3
Kenya 981 0.95 7.26 1.95 2
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire 700 0.95 7.38 2.64 3
South Africa 949 0.91 9.08 2.48 3
Ethiopia 686 0.90 6.42 2.06 3
Tanzania 650 0.89 6.87 1.29 1
Nigeria 1,107 0.87 7.35 2.67 3
Mali 695 0.86 6.93 1.90 2
Uganda 1,063 0.86 6.76 1.58 2
Southern America
Chile 769 0.91 9.44 2.54 2
Peru 774 0.84 8.84 2.31 3
Bolivia 791 0.84 8.25 2.59 3
Venezuela 790 0.80 9.28 2.82 3
Mexico 796 0.80 9.38 2.25 3
Argentina 700 0.78 9.36 2.10 2
Brazil 958 0.74 9.07 2.61 3
Western Europe
Sweden 471 0.91 10.41 3.71 3
Spain 456 0.91 10.23 2.49 2
Germany 495 0.86 10.35 3.16 3
UK 467 0.84 10.38 3.29 3
France 500 0.79 10.34 2.96 3
Italy 450 0.77 10.25 2.84 3
† In each world region, countries are ranked according to the country mean of Pro-Trade Dummy. Sampling weights correct for
deviations from random sampling. See tables A.3 and A.5 for coding information on all variables.
IIITable A.5: Coding Information and Data Sources for Country-Level Data†
Variable Description and Coding
GDP Per Capitaa GDP per capita (in logs) as of 2006 in international dollars, calculated based on PPP
conversion factors.
Country Mean of Skillb Country average of Skill. Sampling weights correct for deviations from random sam-
pling.
Country Median of Skillb Country median of Skill. Sampling weights correct for deviations from random sam-
pling.
Electoral Processc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 12; higher values correspond to better
institutional quality.
Political Pluralism & Participationc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 16; higher values correspond to higher
degrees of pluralism and participation.
Functioning of Governmentc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 12; higher values correspond to better
functioning of governments.
Freedom of Speech & Belief c Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 16; higher values correspond to higher
degrees of freedom.
Associational & Organizational Rightsc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 12; higher values correspond to stronger
rights.
Rule of Lawc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 16; higher values correspond to better
qualities of judicial institutions.
Personal Autonomy & Individual Rightsc Variable takes on integer values from 0 to 16; higher values correspond to higher
degrees of autonomy.
Trade Opennessd Exports plus imports over GDP.
Labor Force Sharea Share of labor force in total population as of 2006.
PPM e Count of protectionist policy measures between May 01, 2009, and October 31, 2010.
By deﬁnition, protectionist policy measures have been “implemented and almost cer-
tainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests” (red measures) or have been
“either implemented and may involve discrimination against foreign commercial in-
terests” or have been announced/are under consideration and would (if implemented)
almost certainly involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests” (amber
measures).
TRADEOPb Country average of Trade Opinion. Sampling weights correct for deviations from
random sampling.
DEMOf Democracy index as of 2006; variable takes on values from 0 to 10; higher values
correspond to more democratic regimes.
† Data sources: a World Development Indicators. b GAP survey data. c Freedom House; data as of 2007.
d Penn World Tables. e Global Trade Alert. f Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).
B Transmission of Preferences to Policies
This appendix asks whether the transmission of people’s trade preferences into governments’ policy
measures is correlated with a country’s political regime. To answer this question, we run a regression
of the following form on the cross-sectional sample of 47 countries in the GAP:
PPMc = α0 + α1 · TRADEOPc + α2TRADEOPc × DEMOc + α3DEMOc + ǫc, (A.1)
where PPMc is the Global Trade Alert count of protectionist policy measures in country c between
May 01, 2009, and October 31, 2010, TRADEOPc is the country-average of the four-valued ordered
trade opinion variable from the GAP, DEMOc is a democracy index from the Economist Intelligence
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Figure A.1: Transmission of Trade Preferences to Policy Measures
uses parameter estimates of equation (A.1) to visualize
∆PPMc
∆TRADEOPc
= α1 + α2 · DEMOc (A.2)
together with the corresponding conﬁdence intervals based on estimation of robust standard errors.
Point estimates from this regression exercise suggest that the link between free trade preferences and
governments’ policy measures is strongest for Sweden, the country with the highest democracy index
in the estimation sample. In turn, Chinese trade policy seems to be independent of people’s attitudes
towards trade.
V